Crime and Punishment and Punishment: Civil Forfeiture, Double Jeopardy and the War on Drugs by Osgood, David
Washington Law Review 
Volume 71 Number 2 
4-1-1996 
Crime and Punishment and Punishment: Civil Forfeiture, Double 
Jeopardy and the War on Drugs 
David Osgood 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David Osgood, Notes and Comments, Crime and Punishment and Punishment: Civil Forfeiture, Double 
Jeopardy and the War on Drugs, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 489 (1996). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol71/iss2/7 
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 1996 by Washington Law Review Association
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT AND PUNISHMENT: CIVIL
FORFEITURE, DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE WAR ON
DRUGS
David Osgood
Abstract: Over the past several years, the Supreme Court taken a hard look at statutes that
impose "quasi-criminal" sanctions such as "civil" punishment for criminal behavior. In
several high profile cases, the Court has extended double jeopardy protection to defendants
subjected to civil sanctions. By looking at the punitive intent behind "civil" sanctions, the
Court has embroiled itself in the highly-charged debate surrounding civil drug forfeitures.
This Comment examines the tension between the Court's emergent philosophy on double
jeopardy and so-called "civil" sanctions, and its application in the Ninth Circuit case, United
States v. S405.089.23, which the Court heard on April 17. This Comment concludes by
arguing that $405,089.23 is the logical outgrowth of the Supreme Court's own decisions, and
that despite the unsympathetic facts of the case, the underlying constitutional values compel
its affirmation.
From the early days of the republic, the Federal Government has been
able to confiscate vehicles, ships, and houses believed to be used in the
commission of crimes, regardless of the owner's guilt or innocence.' In
the 1970s, Congress extended these "civil forfeiture" statutes to target
the assets of suspected criminals as part of the "war on drugs,"2 and in
1984, Congress gave enforcement agencies the power to use seized assets
exclusively for law enforcement purposes.3 Since then, civil forfeiture
laws have become one of the Federal Government's most powerful
weapons against drug dealers, organized crime, money launderers, and
others. By the late 1980s, forfeiture laws were being treated increasingly
as revenue sources for law enforcement; ' for many, this has become
cause for concern.6
I. See Act of July 31, 1789, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 39, 47 (1850); United States v. The Cargo of the Brig
Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
2. See I David B. Smith, Prosecution and Defense of Forfeiture Cases 1.01, at 1-4 (1995).
Congress enacted civil forfeiture provisions under the RICO statute, which "reflected a new
awareness of the importance of economic sanctions." Id.
3. Id. at 1-7 ("[T]he most significant change wrought by the 1984 Act was the earmarking of
forfeited assets exclusively for law enforcement purposes .... The allotting of forfeited assets for
law enforcement purposes provided a tremendous incentive to seek forfeiture simply to raise revenue
for law enforcement agencies.").
4. See 4 No. 17 Dep't of Justice Alert 2 (Oct. 3, 1994) ("By all accounts, civil forfeiture is a major
part of criminal enforcement. A few critics complain that it is the dominant force in law enforcement
today.").
5. Smith, supra note 2 at 1-16. Smith quotes Attorney General Richard Thornburgh on the occasion
of the transfer of $229 million from the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Fund to the Bureau of
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Civil forfeiture offers authorities many substantive and procedural
advantages over criminal forfeitures. By using civil forfeiture, authorities
benefit from a lesser burden of proof. Once the government shows the
existence of probable cause to believe that property is being used to
facilitate an illegal act, the defendant must prove by a "preponderance of
the evidence" that either the property is not subject to forfeiture or that a
valid defense exists.7 Under criminal forfeiture statutes, the authorities
must first prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Additionally, under civil forfeiture statutes, authorities operate under the
legal fiction that they are punishing "guilty" property instead of a
person,8 and so avoid many of the constitutional protections customarily
available to a defendant in a criminal prosecution.9
One of those constitutional protections is the Fifth Amendment's bar
against "double jeopardy."'" Historically, the Constitution's Double
Jeopardy Clause was held to apply only to "criminal punishments." For
example, a criminal acquittal would not bar a subsequent action to
enforce sanctions by way of forfeiture of goods or enforce other civil
Prisons. Thornburgh said, "It's satisfying to think that it's now possible for a drug dealer to serve
time in a forfeiture-financed prison after being arrested by agents driving a forfeiture-provided
automobile while working in a forfeiture-funded sting operation." For a spirited discussion of civil
forfeiture in the United States, see Henry J. Hyde, Forfeiting Our Property Rights: Is Your Property
Safe from Seizure? (1995).
6. See Andrew Schneider & Mary Pat Flaherty, Presumed Guilty: The Law's Pictims in the War on
Drugs, Pittsburgh Press, Aug. 11-16, 1991 (reprint). According to this series of articles, 80% of
people who lost property to the federal government via civil forfeiture were never charged with the
underlying offense: "The owners' only crime in many of these cases: The) 'looked' like drug
dealers. They were black, Hispanic, or flashily dressed." Id. at 3.
7. See I Steven L. Kessler, Civil and Criminal Forfeiture, §3.01[2][h] (1995); United States v. Real
Property Located at Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511, 1519 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct.
762 (1996):
The government bears the initial burden of showing probable cause that the property seized is
the proceeds of a federal narcotics violation or was used to commit or facilitate such a violation.
Although the government must show "more than mere suspicion," establishing probable cause is
not a heavy burden, requiring only that the government "demonstrate by some credible evidence
the probability that the [property] was in fact" drug-related.
Id. (citations omitted).
8. See, e.g., United States v. One Mercedes-Benz 380 SEL, 604 F. Supp. 1307, 1312 (S.D.N.Y.
1984), af'd, 762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985).
9. United States v. $191,910.00 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 1994) ("We are
particularly wary of civil forfeiture statutes, for they impose 'quasi-criminal' penalties without
affording property owners all of the procedural protections afforded criminal defendants. The
relative ease of obtaining forfeitures may tempt the government to seek crimitial law enforcement
objectives through these nominally 'civil' proceedings.") (citations omitted).
i0. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb .... U.S. Const. amend. V.
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penalties." However, recent Supreme Court opinions have shown a
willingness to look at the intent underlying a sanction labeled "civil."' 2
Where the Court has found that a civil sanction serves punitive goals, it
has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause may apply.'3 Unfortunately, the
Court's decisions have also set forth contradictory standards for what
constitutes "punishment." Consequently, the circuit courts have been left
to formulate their own tests with no clear guidance.
Within this framework, the Ninth Circuit has re-examined the
applicability of double jeopardy to civil sanctions, particularly with
regard to drug forfeiture and money laundering laws. While some
circuits have adopted- a "proportionality" analysis that compares the
amount of a forfeiture to the magnitude of an offense, 4 the Ninth Circuit
has rejected this in favor of a broader categorical approach that looks at
the structure, legislative history, and deterrent or punitive intent behind
the statute imposing the sanction. 5 Where a civil forfeiture statute is
designed, even in part, to deter or punish, double jeopardy will bar the
forfeiture once a criminal plea has been accepted 6 or a jury impaneled. 7
Conversely, where a judgment of forfeiture is entered first, double
jeopardy will bar a subsequent criminal proceeding. 8
The Ninth Circuit's approach has ignited considerable controversy. In
United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency,9 the court held that a civil
forfeiture of drug proceeds pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) and 21
U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6) was barred by an earlier criminal conviction. Because
of the nature of the property involved, and driven perhaps by the extreme
facts of the particular case,2" $405,089.23 has split the circuits, 2' and
given the Supreme Court yet another double jeopardy conflict for review.
11. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984). See also One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (per curiam).
12. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994); Austin v. United States, 113 S.
Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
13. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447-48.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
15. United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), modified on denial of
rehearing en banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996).
16. United States v. Faber, 57 F.3d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1995).
17. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978).
18. United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996).
19. 33 F.3d 1210.
20. Claimants were accused of conducting a large-scale methamphetamine manufacturing operation,
and laundering the money through a series of front corporations to make it look like they were
successfully engaged in gold mining activities. Seized property included "$405,089.23 in a Security
Pacific Bank account; $8,929.93 in three Bank of America accounts; $123,000 in cash and 138 silver
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Part I of this Comment takes a cursory look at the historical nature of
the double jeopardy protection; part II examines the three Supreme Court
cases that have revolutionized the modem doctrine. Part III analyzes how
the circuit courts have synthesized the Supreme Court's holdings, with
particular focus on the Ninth Circuit's approach in $405,089.23. Part IV
probes the emergent split amongst the circuits and assesse; the reasoning
presented by each. Finally, this Comment concludes by arguing that the
methodology established by the Ninth Circuit is the only logical
approach to the standard developed by the Court; if anything, it has not
gone far enough.
I. DOUBLE JEOPARDY - A PRIMER
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution is said to consist of three separate protections. It protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against
prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and against multiple
punishments for the same offense.22 Traditionally, double jeopardy was
seen solely as a criminal protection,23 and the test for whether a civil
sanction was essentially criminal in nature was high.24 At least where the
"multiple prosecution" components were involved, great deference was
given to whether Congress's characterization of a "penalizing
mechanism" was civil or criminal.2 5 To negate Congress's intention to
create a "civil" penalty, one had to prove that the sanction: (1) involved
an affirmative disability or restraint, (2) historically had been regarded as
punishment; (3) came into play only on a finding of scienter;
(4) promoted the traditional aims of punishment, retribution and
deterrence; (5) applied to behavior that was already a crime; (6) had no
rational alternate purpose; or, (7) was excessive in relation to that
bars seized at Maryhill Bail Bonds; one Bell 47 G-2 helicopter; one shrimp boat; a Piper 6 Cherokee
airplane; and eleven automobiles and one boat purchased at an auction." Id. at 1214.
21. See Smith v. United States, 76 F.3d 879 (7t Cir. 1996); United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S.
Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 553 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 297
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
22. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other gro rnds by Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
23. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1938).
24. See United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144
(1963).
25. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248.
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purpose.26 This showing became known as the "Kennedy- Ward test," and
was exceptionally difficult to meet, especially because the government
could always argue that forfeiture primarily served a remedial purpose.27
On the other hand, once a defendant showed under the Kennedy-Ward
test that the sanction was severe enough to render a proceeding
essentially "criminal," he was entitled to the full panoply of
constitutional protections due defendants in criminal proceedings.
II. THE SUPREME COURT TAKES A CLOSER LOOK AT
"CIVIL" SANCTIONS
A. United States v. Halper
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court began to re-examine the nature of
so-called "civil sanctions." In United States v. Halper,28 a former medical
service manager was tried and convicted of filing inflated Medicare
claims. For submitting sixty-five claims, each for nine dollars over the
actual claim amount, Halper initially netted $585, plus two years in
prison and a $5000 fine.29 After his conviction, the government brought
an action under the False Claims Act."0 Based on the facts established in
the criminal conviction, the district court held that the defendant was
subject to a civil penalty of $2000 for each claim, an additional amount
equal to twice the amount of damages the government sustained, plus the
costs of the civil action.3 Because the defendant violated the act sixty-
five times, he was theoretically subject to a $130,000 penalty.32 But the
district court concluded that a civil remedy that large would constitute a
second punishment under double jeopardy analysis, as the amount of the
penalty bore no rational relation to either the actual damages suffered or
the expenses incurred by the Government in prosecuting the case.
s3
However, because the district court viewed the purpose of the penalty
provisions of the statute as ensuring the Government was fully
26. Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69.
27. See 3 No. I I Dep't of Justice Alert 2 (Sept. 6-20, 1993) (advising that government attorneys
should argue that forfeitures serve remedial purposes such as disrupting criminal enterprises).
28. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
29. Id. at 437.
30. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-31 (1994).
31. Halper, 490 U.S. at 438 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982 ed., Supp. II) (amended in 1986 to
increase the civil penalty to not less than $5000 and not more than $10,000 plus three times amount
of damages the government sustains)).
32. Id.
33. United States v. Halper, 660 F. Supp. 531, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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compensated for any damages it incurred, and imposition of the full
penalty as discretionary, the court awarded damages of $16,000 as the
approximate amount required to make the Government "whole. 34
The Government appealed, and on direct review the Supreme Court
found for the defendant. In doing so, it relied on the third double
jeopardy protection-the proscription against multiple punishments---to
skirt a long line of precedents holding that a civil fine was insufficient to
establish a criminal proceeding for double jeopardy purposes.35 At least
in the multiple punishments context, Congress's intent to impose a civil
penalty was no longer dispositive:
[W]hile recourse to statutory language, structure, and intent is
appropriate in identifying the inherent nature of a proceeding, or in
determining the constitutional safeguards that must accompany
those proceedings as a general matter, the approach is not well
suited to the context of the "humane interests" safeguarded by the
Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple punishments.
... This constitutional protection is intrinsically porsonal. Its
violation can be identified only by assessing the character of the
actual sanctions imposed on the individual by the machinery of the
state.36
The Court rejected the labels "civil" and "criminal" as irrelevant. It
found that the concept of punishment exists in both civil and criminal
law:
[F]or the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constitutes
multiple punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we
must follow the notion where it leads .... Simply put, a civil as
well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the
sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of
punishment.37
The Court then attempted to define when a civil sanction became
"punishment." It first concluded that because retribution and deterrence
were not legitimate non-punitive government objectives, "a civil sanction
34. Id. at 534.
35. Halper, 490 U.S. at 440-42. See also Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956);
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391
(1938). The Court also distinguished these cases as involving "roughly remedial" penalties, i.e.,
penalties proportional to the harm done the government. Halper, 490 U.S. at 446.
36. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 447-48.
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that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term., 38 But
then moderating its position, the Court held that the Government may not
criminally prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him,
and then bring a separate civil action based on the same conduct and
receive a judgment that is not rationally related to the goal of making the
Government whole.39
B. Austin v. United States
The Supreme Court revisited the civil punishment issue in Austin v.
United States.4' In Austin, the petitioner was indicted on four counts of
violating South Dakota's drug laws. He ultimately pleaded guilty to one
count for a relatively minor drug sale, and was sentenced to seven years'
imprisonment." The United States then filed an in rem action seeking
forfeiture of Austin's mobile home and business under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881 (a)(4), (7).42 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the
forfeiture on the principle that if the guilt or innocence of the property's
owner is constitutionally irrelevant in an in rem proceeding, 3 "the
constitution hardly requires proportionality review of forfeitures."'
Austin deals primarily with the question of whether the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause45 applies to in rem civil forfeiture
38. Id. at 448 (emphasis added) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963)).
39. Id. at 449,451.
40. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
41. Id. at2803.
42. Id. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (7) (1994) provide for the forfeiture of:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are intended for
use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or
concealment of [controlled substances, their raw materials, and equipment used in their
manufacture and distribution]
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in
the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or
intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment ..
43. United States v. 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 1992).
44. Id. (citing United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861 F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 954 (1989)).
45. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. Const. amend. VIll.
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proceedings. The Supreme Court held it does, observing that while some
provisions of the Bill of Rights expressly limit themselves to criminal
cases by their language, the Eighth Amendment dozs not.46 The
Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract
payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense.47
The Court relied on Halper for the notion that punishment, as commonly
understood, cuts across the division between civil and criminal law.48
Thus, the issue faced in Austin (at least in an excessive fines context),
was not "whether forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) is civil or
criminal, but rather whether it is punishment.
' 49
Though the Court recognized that forfeitures may be partly remedial,
it adopted the Halper punishment analysis, that is, where "a civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, [it] is punishment."5 Looking at the history of statutory
forfeiture in the United States, and specifically at the language,
provisions, and legislative history of 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4), (7), the
Court found nothing "to contradict the historical un( erstanding of
forfeiture as punishment."'" Because both statutes provided an "innocent
owner" defense,52 Congress chose to tie forfeiture d:rectly to the
commission of drug offenses,53 and "forfeiture statutes historically have
been understood as serving not simply remedial goals but also those of
46. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2804-05.
47. Id. at 2805 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266-67, 275
(1989)).
48. Id. at 2805 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,447-48 (1989)).
49. Id. at 2806. The Court further went on to distinguish the Kennedy and Ward cases as only
applying when a civil penalty rose to such a level that the safeguards thai attend a criminal
prosecution should be required. "In addressing the . . . question whether punishment is being
imposed, the Court has not employed the tests articulated in Mendoza-Martinez and Ward." Id. at
2806 n.6.
50. Id. at 2806 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448.)
51. Id. at2810.
52. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (1994) ("[N]o conveyance shall be forfeited under this paragraph
to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission establisl ed by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the
owner."). See also 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) ("[N]o property shall be forfeited undtr this paragraph, to
the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission establish,-d by that owner to
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.").
53. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811. See also S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983).
496
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punishment and deterrence,"' the Court found that the statutes imposed
"punishment" for application of the Excessive Fines Clause.5
The Austin Court recognized that the "categorical" approach it
adopted was at odds with the case-by-case, fact-specific approach
advocated in Halper. It distinguished Halper by noting that Halper
involved fixed-penalty provisions, which ordinarily "do no more than
make the Government whole."56 Such an approach was inappropriate for
forfeitures where the value of the conveyances and real property
forfeitable could "vary so dramatically that any relationship between the
Government's actual costs and the amount of the sanction is merely
coincidental.""
C. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch
In the next major double jeopardy controversy, Department of
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch," the Supreme Court applied the "categorical
approach" formulated in Austin. It held that a tax on the possession of
illegal drugs assessed after the State imposed a criminal penalty for the
same conduct violated the constitutional prohibition of "successive
punishments" for the same offense. 9 As in Austin, the Court examined
the history and structure of the civil sanction and concluded that because
it could be "fairly characterized as punishment," it was subject to the
Double Jeopardy Clause."
In Kurth Ranch, the defendants operated a marijuana growing
operation out of the family farm in central Montana.6 Approximately
two weeks after the Montana Drug Tax Act62 went into effect, the State
raided the farm and shut down the operation. In the Supreme Court's
opinion, this gave rise to four separate and distinct legal proceedings:63
(1) criminal charges filed in the Montana District Court; (2) civil
54. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 28121n.14 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 449 (1989)).
55. See also Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993) (decided on the same day as Austin,
remanding criminal forfeiture to district court for application of Excessive Fines Clause).
56. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at2812 n.14.
57. Id.
58. 114.Ct. 1937 (1994).
59. Id. at 1940.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1942.
62. Mont. Code Ann. §§ 15-25-101 to 123 (1995) (repealed). See Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1941-
42 nn.l-5.
63. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1942.
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forfeiture of cash and equipment;' 4 (3) assessment of the Montana "drug
=11;65 and (4) a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.66
The Kurths challenged the constitutionality of the drug tax during the
bankruptcy proceedings, and the bankruptcy court concluded that the
assessment was invalid under the Federal Constitution as a violation of
double jeopardy.67 The bankruptcy court, though ostensibly relying on
Halper, applied an Austin-like analysis and examined both the historical
understanding of drug tax laws as penal, and the retributive and deterrent
nature of the Montana drug tax statute before it. The district court
affirmed the bankruptcy court, and concluded that the Montana
Dangerous Drug Act "simply punishes the Kurths a second time for the
same criminal conduct."6 The appeals court also affirmed, although it
was not willing to hold the tax unconstitutional per se. 9 The appeals
court recognized that the central inquiry under Halper is whether the
sanction imposed is related to the damages the government suffered.70
Because the State refused to offer evidence as to its "damages," the court
found the tax unconstitutional as applied to the Kurths.7"
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, resting its decision both on
Halper's "multiple punishments" theory and on the "successive
proceeding" arm of the Double Jeopardy Clause.72 Analyzing the
structure of the tax statute, the Court noted several unusual features. The
"so-called" tax was conditioned on the commission of a crime, showing
"penal and prohibatory intent" as opposed to a simple irtent to gather
revenue.73 The tax was exacted only after the taxpayer had been arrested
for the "taxable activity": "Persons who have been arrested for
possessing marijuana constitute the entire class of taxpayers subject to
the Montana tax."'74 The same sovereign that criminalized the activity
64. The respondents settled the forfeiture action prior to this case. Id.
65. The Montana Department of Revenue assessed a total of $894,940.99 in taxes on marijuana
plants, harvested marijuana, hash tar, and hash oil, and interest and penalties. Id. at 1942-43 & n.10.
66. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1994).
67. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1943.
68. Id. (quoting In re Kurth Ranch, 1991 WL 365065 at *4 (Bankr. D. Mont. Apr. 23, 1991)).
69. Id. at 1943-44.
70. In re Kurth Ranch, 986 F.2d 1308, 1310-12 (9th Cir. 1993).
71. Id.
72. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1947 n.21 ("[T]he statute [does not] require us to comment on the
permissibility of 'multiple punishments' imposed in the same proceeding, since t involves separate
sanctiohs imposed in successive proceedings.") (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 1947.
74. Id.
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imposed the tax,7" and although the tax was nominally "'a tax on the
possession and storage of dangerous drugs"' it was levied against goods
that were neither owned nor possessed by the taxpayer at the time it was
imposed.76 In short, the Court concluded that "this drug tax is a
concoction of anomalies, too far-removed in crucial respects from a
standard tax assessment to escape characterization as punishment for the
purpose of Double Jeopardy analysis.""
Once it ruled that Montana's tax statute was fairly characterized as
punishment," the Court rejected application of Halper's proportionality
doctrine. While in Halper the Court recognized that a civil penalty may
be imposed as a remedy for actual costs to the state attributable to the
defendant's conduct, Halper's method of determining whether the
sanction was remedial or punitive simply did not work in the case of a
tax statute. 79 Because the formula that Montana used to compute the tax
assessment would be the same regardless of the amount of the State's
damages, if any, "[s]ubjecting Montana's drug tax to Halper's test for
civil penalties is therefore inappropriate." 0 Or to put it another way the
amount of the tax imposed could "vary so dramatically that any
relationship between the Government's actual costs and the amount of
the sanction is merely coincidental.""
The Court's conclusion also suggested that Montana's tax should be
barred as a "successive prosecution":
This drug tax is not the kind of remedial sanction that may follow
the first punishment of a criminal offense. Instead, it is a second
punishment within the contemplation of a constitutional protection
that has "deep roots in our history and jurisprudence," and therefore
must be imposed during the first prosecution or not at all. The
proceeding Montana initiated to collect a tax on the possession of
drugs was the functional equivalent of a successive criminal
prosecution that placed the Kurths in jeopardy a second time "for
the same offense." 2
75. Id. at 1947 n.22.
76. Id. at 1948 (quoting Mont. Code Ann. § 15-25-111 (1987)).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citing id. at 1950 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)).
80. Id.
81. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 n.14 (1993).
82. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1948 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989)).
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Kurth Ranch was a 5-4 decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist felt that the
tax should be treated not as punishment, but as a "genuine tax,"
something akin to a "sin tax" for double jeopardy purposes.83 Justice
O'Connor felt that the Halper proportionality doctrine should apply.84
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, would have gone further by
overruling Halper as erroneously decided and scrapping the multiple
punishment component of double jeopardy entirely. In Justice Scalia's
opinion, the multiple punishments protection does not exist, and all cases
citing it merely repeat dicturn.8 Where the legislatare authorizes
successive punishments, a defendant's recourse should be to due
process," to keep the punishment within legislatively established bounds,
and to the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Excessive Fines Clauses,
to limit what those bounds may legitimately be.8
Commenting that the holding in Halper produced "results too strange
for judges to endure, and regularly demands judgments of the most
problematic sort," Justice Scalia predicted that future cases "will demand
much more of us: disallowing criminal punishment because a civil
sanction has already been imposed."88 Based on the perceived "social
costs" of enforcing what he considered a "fictional" multiple
punishments right, he would overrule Halper and hold that the Double
Jeopardy Clause only prohibits successive prosecutions, not multiple
punishments.89
Nor did Justice Scalia accept that what was being decided in Kurth
Ranch was really a "successive prosecutions" case. If the majority
opinion implied that any proceeding which evokes the multiple-
punishments component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is a criminal
prosecution, that assumption would ignore the standards set by the court
in both Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez" and United States, v. Ward."' As
the test of when a civil prosecution arises to the level of criminal
prosecution for double jeopardy purposes, "Halper's focus on whether
the sanction serves the goals of 'retribution and deterrence' is just one
83. Id. at 1952 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
84. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1955-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
86. Yet it is unclear how much due process Justice Scalia would provide. See United States v. James
Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 507 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissentiig).
87. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1958 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (emphasis in original).
89. Id. at 1958-59.
90. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
91. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
500
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factor in the Kennedy-Ward test . . . and one factor alone is not
dispositive."'92 Justice Scalia would apply Kennedy-Ward to the Montana
tax proceeding and hold that it did not constitute a criminal prosecution
warranting double jeopardy protection.93
III. FOLLOWING THE NOTION WHERE IT LEADS
Taken together, Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch revolutionize how
the Supreme Court will treat ostensibly civil sanctions. By focusing on
the actual intended effect of a sanction, the Court has adopted a much
more realistic approach than mere acquiescence to the "civil" label
attached by Congress. By revivifying the long-dormant94 multiple
punishments component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Court
managed to artfully avoid the pitfalls it set for itself in over sixty years of
double jeopardy jurisprudence." While they do not overrule prior
precedents, these cases represent a pragmatic response to the overuse,
and sometimes abuse96 of civil sanctions as a supplement to criminal
punishment. To the extent that these abuses are the result of the Court's
prior unwillingness to attach constitutional protections to "quasi-
criminal" proceedings, thereby making so-called "civil" remedies more
appealing to Congress and law enforcement, this shift is long overdue.
92. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1959 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69;
Ward, 448 U.S. at 250-51).
93. Id. at 1960.
94. According to Justice Scalia, only two cases prior to Halper relied on the multiple punishments
arm of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and then, only in part. Id. at 1956-57 (citing Ex Parte Lange, 85
U.S. 163 (1873); In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943)).
95. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984); One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350
U.S. 148 (1956); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943); Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938).
96. See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993). The Court
stated:
The extent of the Government's financial stake in drug forfeiture is apparent from a 1990
memo, in which the Attorney General urged United States Attorneys to increase the volume of
forfeitures in order to meet the Department of Justice's annual budget target:
"We must significantly increase production to reach our budget target."
"... Failure to achieve the S470 million projection would expose the Department's forfeiture
program to criticism and undermine confidence in our budget projections. Every effort must be
made to increase forfeiture income during the remaining three months of [fiscal year] 1990."
Id. at 502 n.2 (quoting Executive Office for United States Attorneys, U.S. Dep't of Justice, 38
United States Attorney's Bull. 180 (1990)).
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However, even though Justice Scalia might ultimately be wrong, he
does raise a valid issue--by avoiding the successive proceedings issue
entirely, Halper has raised fundamental questions about the function of
the multiple punishments component of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Given the current focus on the ultimate goal of a statutory sanction, i.e.,
whether or not the sanction was designed, even in part, for retribution or
deterrence, the nature of the proceeding it is imposed in becomes
irrelevant. Thus, application of a multiple punishment test essentially
renders the successive proceedings component redundant. This is
especially so considering the fact that multiple punishments are
permissible when imposed within the confines of a single proceeding. 97
Only when multiple punishments are imposed in separate, successive
proceedings may the multiple punishments component of double
jeopardy operate. And when it does, it not only bars the second
unconstitutional punishment, but may also bar the proceeding that would
ultimately impose it.9"
But that does not mean that the multiple punishments component of
the Double Jeopardy Clause is inccnsistent with the separate proceedings
components. If there were no multiple punishment prohibition under
double jeopardy, why would successive proceedings be barred? If
multiple punishments are allowed, it would not make sense to prohibit
the proceedings that would impose them. Conversely, it would be a strain
to imagine that the framers of the Double Jeopardy Clause intended to
prohibit the government from bringing separate proceedings that bore no
adverse consequences for the defendant whatsoever.99 It is only the threat
97. See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 369 (1983).
98. See, e.g., Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2204-05 (1995) (holding that where a
defendant is not yet twice convicted, multiple punishment claim is ripe for appellate review); United
States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682, 686 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a defendant shculd not be forced to
endure personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of criminal trial whcxe there is colorable
claim that Double Jeopardy Clause will be violated), cert. denied, 1996 WL 730101 (U.S. Apr. 15,
1996).
99. See, e.g., ExParte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 173 (1873):
Why is it that, having once been tried and found guilty, [a criminal defendant] can never be
tried again for that offence? Manifestly, it is not the danger or jeopardy of bc ing a second time
found guilty. It is the punishment that would legally follow the second conviction which is the
real danger guarded against by the Constitution. But if, after judgment has been rendered on the
conviction, and the sentence of that judgment executed on the criminal, he can be again
sentenced on that conviction to another and different punishment, or to endure the same
punishment a second time, is the constitutional restriction of any value? Is nct its intent and its
spirit in such a case as much violated as if a new trial had been had, and on a second conviction
a second punishment inflicted?
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of a successive punishment brought in a separate proceeding that would
force a defendant to go through the "harassment" of a successive trial, or
"marshal the resources and energies necessary for his defense more than
once for the same alleged criminal acts.' '""u Viewing the separate
proceedings components as simply barring the process by which
punishment is meted out, the Double Jeopardy Clause can be seen as
really offering two protections: it protects against the threat of
punishment after acquittal and against the threat of successive
punishments. By necessary implication, it must also protect against the
successive punishment itself.''
Unfortunately, this has not always been the case. The current direction
the Supreme Court is moving conflicts with its prior holdings in One Lot
Emerald Cut Stones v. United States 2 and United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms.3 In both cases, defendants were tried and
acquitted in criminal proceedings, then later subjected to separate civil
forfeiture proceedings based on the "remedial" purposes of removing the
res from circulation."° Both cases relied on Helvering v. Mitchell' for
the proposition that the Double Jeopardy Clause only prohibits
"punishing twice, or attempting a second time to punish criminally, for
the same offense."'0 6 Both cases deferred to the civil labels given their
respective forfeitures by Congress - because the second proceedings or
punishments were not "criminal," they were allowed. Both cases
perceived their respective forfeitures as broadly remedial, "in spite of
their comparative severity."'0 7
This new emphasis on successive punishment has developed
incrementally over several cases, however, the Court seems satisfied with
its result. In lieu of the traditional double jeopardy formulation found in
The argument seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the Constitution was designed
as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offence as from being
twice tried for it.
100. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1959).
101. See Witte, 115 S. Ct. at 2204 (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause serves function of
preventing both successive punishment and successive prosecution).
102. 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
103. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
104. In the case of Firearms, eighty-nine firearms were found in the possession of an unlicensed
dealer. 465 U.S. at 355-56; and in Emeralds, precious stones and jewelry were allegedly smuggled
into the United States, 409 U.S. at 232-33.
105. 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
106. Id.; Firearms, 465 U.S. at 360; Emeralds, 409 U.S. at 235-36.
107. Emeralds, 409 U.S. at 237 (quoting Helvering, 303 U.S. at 400).
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North Carolina v. Pearce, "' the Court now offers a different explication
of the Double Jeopardy Clause-now the clause serves i:he function of
preventing both successive prosecution and successive punishment."°
Given the Court's increasing reluctance to rely on civil labels given to
quasi-criminal sanctions, cases such as Helvering, Rex Trailer, Emeralds,
and Firearms have become anachronistic and contrary to current Court
doctrine. Insofar as they are inconsistent with Halper, Austin, and Kurth
Ranch, they should be overruled.
As has been shown, after Halper, the factors that drove the Court in
Helvering, Emeralds, and Firearms no longer motivate it today.
Congress's intent in labeling a proceeding is irrelevant in the multiple or
successive punishments context. It is the intent to impose a second
punishment, either civil or criminal, that is dispositive in bringing down
the double jeopardy bar."' After Austin, it is insufficient for a sanction to
serve a "roughly remedial" purpose; any non-remedial punitive intent
renders a sanction punishment."' That Austin's categorical test has
displaced Halper's proportionality analysis where statutory forfeiture
allows an amount of recovery that is merely fortuitous, or coincidental to
the Government's costs, is shown in Kurth Ranch."2
Many courts were quick to pick up on the implications of the Halper,
Austin, and Kurth Ranch line of cases. In United States v. Torres,"3 the
defendant sought reversal of his criminal conviction on double jeopardy
grounds. The Seventh Circuit observed that as the result of a drug "sting"
operation, the Government brought separate criminal and administrative
proceedings, and issued a warning:
With the benefit of Austin and Kurth Ranch, both of which were
decided after this prosecution began, the prosecutor doubtless can see the
hazards of such an approach. The United States would do well to seek
imprisonment, fines, and forfeiture in one proceeding. When choosing
between civil and criminal forfeitures, the prosecutor will have to recall
108. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v.
Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989).
109. Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2199, 2204 (1995); United States v. Dixcn, 113 S. Ct. 2849,
2860 (1993).
110. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,447-148 (1989).
111. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 (1993).
112. 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994).
113. 28 F.3d 1463, 1464 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994).
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that after Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch the nomenclature "civil" does
not carry much weight."4
However, Torres also received notice inviting him to make a claim in
the forfeiture proceeding, but did not do so. Because he failed to claim
the money seized in the drug transaction, in the court's opinion, he did
not become a party to the forfeiture. Because there was no opposition to
the forfeiture, there was no trial, and jeopardy did not attach. Torres was
not at risk in the forfeiture proceeding, and "'[w]ithout risk of a
determination of guilt, jeopardy does not attach, and neither an appeal
nor further prosecution constitutes double jeopardy.""' 5
Likewise, in United States v. Tilley,"6 (a pre-Kurth Ranch case), the
Fifth Circuit denied the defendant's double jeopardy challenge to his
conviction based on a stipulated forfeiture of approximately $650,000
worth of cash, certificates of deposit, automobiles, and other personal
property. The court recognized that:
The pending criminal trial in this case, if it results in a conviction,
would, of course, subject the defendants to punishment. Thus, if the
prior civil forfeiture proceeding, which was predicated on the same
drug trafficking offenses as charged in the indictment, constituted a
"punishment," the Double Jeopardy Clause will bar the pending
criminal trial." 7
The court refused to consider the Austin analysis in determining
whether the civil forfeiture constituted a "punishment" for double
jeopardy purposes. It narrowly read Austin as only involving forfeitures
of conveyances and real estate, and not the forfeiture of drug proceeds."'
Instead, the court applied a Halper-like proportionality analysis to
determine that the amount of the sanction was not "overwhelmingly
disproportionate" to "the wholly remedial purposes of reimbursing the
government for the costs of detection, investigation, and prosecution of
drug traffickers and reimbursing society for the costs of combating the
allure of illegal drugs, caring for the victims of the criminal trade...
etc.""' 9 Estimating the costs of the illicit drug trade to the government
and society at $60 billion to $120 billion per year, the court found a
114. Id. at 1464-65.
115. Id. at 1465 (quoting Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 389 (1975)).
116. 18 F.3d 295 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
117. Id. at 297-98.
118. Id. at 300.
119. Id. at 299.
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$650,000 sanction "not 'overwhelmingly disproportionate' on a national
level" and roughly remedial for the Halper test. 2 '
Beyond its "proportionality" analysis, the Tilley cour: held that the
forfeiture of the proceeds from illegal drug sales nevertheless was not
punishment because it did not involve the extraction of lawfully derived
property from the forfeiting party.
When, however, the property taken by the government was not
derived from lawful activities, the forfeiting party loses3 nothing to
which the law ever entitled him. . . .The possessor of proceeds
from illegal drug sales never invested honest labor or other lawfully
derived property to obtain the subsequently forfeited proceeds.
Consequently, he has no reasonable expectation that the law will
protect, condone, or even allow, his continued possession of such
proceeds because they have their very genesis in illegal activity.'
Comparing the forfeiture of proceeds from drug sales to the seizure of
proceeds from the robbery of a federal bank, the court found that such a
forfeiture "merely places that party in the lawfully protected financial
status quo that he enjoyed prior to launching his illegal scheme."
Finally, in United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency," the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the
civil forfeiture of property seized following a claimant's criminal
convictions on various counts of conspiracy and money laundering."
Relying heavily on Jeffers v. United States, 24 Austin, and Halper, the
court asked two questions: (1) whether the civil forfeiture action and the
claimant's criminal prosecution constituted separate "proceedings," and
(2) whether civil forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A)'25 constituted "punishment." Answering the first question
120. Id. Cf United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 9E6 (9th Cir. 1995)
(disproportionately large forfeitures cannot be reasonably justified as civil fines by placing full
responsibility for the "war on drugs" on the shoulders of every individual defendant); United States
v. 38 Whalers Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 37 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 815 (1992) (same).
121. Tilley, 18 F.3dat300.
122. United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), modified on denial
of motion for rehearing en banc, 56 F.3d41 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996).
123. Id. at 1214. Claimants were accused of conducting a large-scale methamphetamine
manufacturing operation, and laundering the money through a series of front corporations to make it
look like they were successfully engaged in gold mining activities. Id.
124. 432 U.S. 137 (1977).
125. Both statutes provide for the forfeiture of drug "proceeds." 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(6) states:
All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to
be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this
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affirmatively, the court held that the forfeiture violated both of the
Double Jeopardy Clause's proscriptions against successive prosecutions
and multiple punishments. 26 The court rejected the government's
argument that parallel criminal and civil cases did not constitute
"separate proceedings" for double jeopardy purposes. It observed that the
civil forfeiture had been awarded the government over a year after the
criminal convictions, by a different district judge, because of the
property's connection with the same offenses that resulted in the
defendant's criminal punishment.'27
The court then proceeded to the second part of its test-whether the
civil forfeiture statute in question constituted "multiple punishment."
Turning its attention to United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms,"'28 the court stated that "[a] decade ago, the law was clear that
civil forfeitures did not constitute 'punishment' for double jeopardy
purposes."'2 9 However, Firearms relies on the United States v. Ward30
test, "which focused heavily on the label Congress had attached to a
particular sanction. If Congress indicated a preference that the
proceeding be denominated 'civil' rather than 'criminal,' the Court
subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all moneys, negotiable instruments,
and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except
that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner,
by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(l)(A) provides for the forfeiture of "[a]ny property, real or personal, involved
in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation... of this title, or any property traceable to such
property."
126. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1215. The court stated:
Whatever other abuses the Clause prohibits, at its most fundamental level it protects an accused
against being forced to defend himself against repeated attempts to exact one or more
punishments for the same offense. "The basis of the Fifth Amendment protection against double
jeopardy is that a person shall not be harassed by successive trials; that an accused shall not
have to marshal the resources and energies necessary for his defense more than once for the
same alleged criminal acts."
Id. (quoting Abbatte v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1959) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
127. Id. at 1216. In holding criminal prosecutions constitute separate proceedings from civil
forfeitures, the panel acknowledged that it put itself at odds with the Second and the Eleventh
Circuits. Both circuits held that where forfeiture actions and criminal prosecutions take place at
approximately the same time, they are part of a "single coordinated prosecution." See United States
v. 18755 North Bay Road, 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (1Ith Cir. 1994); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17,
20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994). This argument has been severely undercut by
the Supreme Court's decision in Kurth Ranch, and its continued vitality is in question.
128. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
129. S405.089.23,33 F.3d at 1218.
130. 448 U.S. 242,248(1980).
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would defer to that preference except in extraordinary circumstances."''
In the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the Supreme Court abandoned the Ward
approach in favor of the test it formulated in Halper:32 "[A] civil
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
purposes, is punishment .... ,,33 This approach was buttressed, in the
$405,089.23 court's view, in Austin v. United States,3'" which again
generally holds that civil forfeitures constitute a form of punishment.
Although Austin was an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause
case, to determine whether the clause applied, the Court :first needed to
determine whether the forfeiture statutes constituted ptLnishment. By
using the Halper double jeopardy analysis, the Austin Court established
that if a forfeiture constitutes punishment under the Halper criteria, it
constitutes punishment for the purposes of both the Excessive Fines and
Double Jeopardy Clauses.'35
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Government's argument
that because the forfeiture involved only narcotics proceeds, the
forfeiture was entirely remedial.'36 The panel interpreted the legal
standard set by Austin as requiring an examination of the scope of the
statute, rather than the characteristics of the property the government is
trying to forfeit.'37 Even if the forfeiture statutes involved were only
concerned with the forfeiture of illegal proceeds, the court found that the
131. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1218.
132. Id.
133. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448 (1989) (distinguishing successive proceedings cases
from multiple punishments cases).
134. 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806, 2812 (1993) (holding that sanction need only serve in part to punish to
be subject to the limitations of Excessive Fines Clause).
135. At least in the Ninth Circuit's opinion. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1219. Set! also Smith, supra
note 2, 12.10[2], at 12-131 ("The Supreme Court's decision in Austin v. Un ted States makes it
clear that Halper's double jeopardy protections do apply to the vast majority of civil forfeiture
cases.").
136. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1220. Cf United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 299-300 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994) (adopting Halper proportionality analysi:;, and holding that
forfeiture of proceeds not so excessive as to render relationship between amotnt of proceeds and
general governmental and societal costs irrational; Austin inapplicable to proceed; forfeitures).
137. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1220. Cf Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 ("[T]he determination whether a
given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense requires a particularized assessment
of the penalty imposed, and the purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve.").
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legal standard established by Austin.38 still led to the conclusion that the
proceeds forfeiture statutes did not serve solely remedial purposes.'39
IV. THE CIRCUITS LINE UP
A. Limiting the Scope of the Double Jeopardy Challenge
To say that confusion ensued following $405,089.23 would rank as
gross understatement. Several circuits have followed $405,089.23's
reasoning to hold that facilitation forfeitures of real property or
conveyances under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(4)(C) and (a)(7) would be barred
by double jeopardy; 41 many of the same circuits have relied on Tilley to
hold that proceeds forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) do not
constitute double jeopardy punishment. 4' Still others, including the
Ninth Circuit, have cited Torres's rationale to deny double jeopardy
protection where the defendant has failed to claim the res, 42 some going
so far as to deny the defense even where the defendant's ownership of
the property could be established by other means. 143
However, given the Supreme Court's recent emphasis on the multiple,
or successive punishment prohibition, reliance on Tilley is questionable
at best; Torres, a "successive prosecutions" case, is inconsistent and must
be overruled. Though there is an instinctive appeal to the argument raised
in Tilley that forfeiture of drug proceeds is not a punishment worthy of
double jeopardy protection, there remains at its core a flawed set of
assumptions that make the argument untenable. It remains a fundamental
tenet in our jurisprudence that a criminal defendant is innocent until
138. I.e., looking at the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment, the punitive purpose
inferred from the focus of the statutes on the owner's culpability, and the congressional intent to
"deter" and "punish." Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993).
139. $405,089.23,33 F.3d at 1220-21. See also Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811-12 (1993).
140. See United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345, 349 (5th Cir. 1995) (abandoning Tilley proportionality
analysis for all but proceeds forfeitures); United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 573 (6th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996); see also United States v. Baird, 63 F.3d 1213, 1216 (3d Cir.
1995) (agreeing in principle), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 909 (1996).
141. United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160, 1169 (3d Cir. 1995); United
States v. Clementi, 70 F.3d 997, 999 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551, 554 (6th
Cir. 1995); Baird, 63 F.3d at 1217.
142. S184,505.01, 72 F.3d at 1167; United States v. Washington, 69 F.3d 401,403 (9th Cir. 1995);
Baird, 63 F.3d at 1218-19; United States v. Arreola-Ramos, 60 F.3d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1995).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Cretacci, 62 F.3d 307, 310-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving forfeiture
of automobile); United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1261 (7th Cir. 1995) (forfeiture of
automobiles and real property), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 931 (1996).
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proven guilty." The government has the burden of proving this guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, and a criminal defendant is entitled to certain
rights and protections.'45 By using civil forfeiture to seize property,
including drug proceeds, the government is allowed to shift that burden.
Once the government shows "probable cause" to believe that money
(property, etc.) was linked to illegal activity, 4 6 the defendant must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not. As previously stated,
this "burden shifting" is allowed under the fiction that the government is
in fact punishing guilty property, regardless of the innocence or guilt of
the criminal defendant. However, in Tilley, the court assumed the
defendant's guilt before any adjudication was ever made."4
In the Tilley court's opinion, the government is free to seize property
"not derived from lawful activities," because the forfeiting party loses
nothing to which he was entitled. 4 While this argument blithely
assumes that no drug purchaser earned his money lawfully, 49 (as
contrasted with the seller), it also stacks the deck againsit a defendant
who has to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his property
was legally derived. For the sake of argument, assuming that an alleged
purchaser could easily prove that he earned his drug money legally,
regardless of his alleged criminal spending habits, would he enjoy double
jeopardy protection from the forfeiture when his counterpart, the alleged
drug dealer, would not? Even a verdict of not guilty does not save a
defendant-an acquittal may not be proof enough to warrant return of the
forfeited property. 5
144. See Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1244 (1994) (citing Commonwealth v. Webster, 59
Mass. 295, 320 (1850)).
145. Such rights include protections against self-incrimination, right to court-appointed counsel, and
trial by jury, to name but a few.
146. This can be a very light burden. It has been estimated that up to 97% of all U.S. currency is
tainted with cocaine residue, sufficient to alert a trained dog to its presence. See United States v.
$639,558 in U.S.-Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 714 n.2 (D.C. App. 1992).
147. In Tilley, defendants brought an interlocutory appeal seeking dismissa' of their criminal
indictment on double jeopardy grounds, after the government forfeited their alleged drug proceeds
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6), (7). United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 574 (1994).
148. Id. at 300. See supra text accompanying note 122.
149. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) by its language, contemplates forfeiture of moneys, negotiable
instruments, securities, things of value "furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in
exchange for a controlled substance." This presunrably applies to either side of a drug transaction.
150. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354 (1984); One Lot Emerald
Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972).
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Moreover, because the Supreme Court has undermined the validity of
facilitation forfeitures on double jeopardy grounds, the government may
recast such claims as proceeds or "instrumentality" forfeiture claims.'
Because only a dim criminal would segregate house or car payments into
those made with legally earned income versus those made with illicit
drug money (and only a dimmer criminal would admit it), the
government may be able to use proceeds forfeitures to seize property
purchased in large part with legitimate income.
Although it is not unreasonable to assume that drug proceeds are
inherently proportional to the damages caused by the illegal activity,
152
thereby making their forfeiture "remedial," that doesn't end the inquiry.
Under Austin, a forfeiture can be perfectly proportional to the harm
caused and still be punishment, so long as it also serves deterrent and
retributive purposes. Given this caveat, there is no reason not to perform
the statutory analysis given proceeds forfeitures in $405,089.23. 153
Again, looking at the factors enunciated in Austin, 54 there is no reason to
overcome the "strong presumption" that the forfeiture provision does not
serve a solely remedial purpose. 55
Finally, if civil forfeiture cases truly fall within the Double Jeopardy
Clause's multiple punishments/successive punishments proscription, then
United States v. Torres'56 deserves to be revisited. In Torres, the
defendant was caught attempting to purchase three kilograms of cocaine
from undercover agents with $60,000 in cash.1 57 Federal agents arrested
the defendant and seized the cash. Torres, though--notified, failed to make
a claim in the civil forfeiture proceeding' 58 and forfeited the property.
Torres later pled guilty to the criminal charges and was sentenced to over
151. See United States v. All Assets of G.P.S. Automotive Corp., 66 F.3d 483, 490-91 (2d Cir.
1995) (government sought to forfeit auto shop as "instrumentality" of criminal activities, without
regard to legitimate business on same premises).
152. United States v. Salinas, 65 F.3d 551,554 (6th Cir. 1995).
153. United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 1994), modified on denial
of rehearing en banc, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996).
154. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2812 (1993). See supra text accompanying note 138.
155. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1220-21. See also Wood v. United States, 863 F.2d 417, 421 (5th Cir.
1989) (holding that forfeiture of drug proceeds under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) "cannot be seriously
considered anything other than an economic penalty for drug trafficking"). Though five years earlier,
Wood was decided by the same panel that decided Tilley.
156. 28 F.3d 1463 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994).
157. Id. at 1464.
158. Id. at 1465.
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six years in prison.'59 He then attacked his conviction on appeal, arguing
that double jeopardy barred it by virtue of the prior forfeiture.161
Essentially, the court decided against Torres on a "successive
prosecution" theory. Because Torres did not file a claim to the currency,
he was not a party to the first proceeding. Under the Seventh Circuit's
theory of double jeopardy, jeopardy does not attach without a
proceeding, that is, without the risk of a determination of guilt.' 6' This
was buttressed, in the court's view, by the nature of the seized property.
Without the defendant's participation in the civil forfeiture, the court had
no way of knowing whether he had any property interest in the currency.
Had he no interest in the currency, he could not be penalized by its
forfeiture.
162
This illustrates one of the problems with being subjected to a civil
forfeiture prior to a criminal proceeding. Civil forfeiture may make
available to law enforcement a wide range of discovery procedures
otherwise unavailable in the criminal context. 6 As in a civil suit, the law
enforcement authorities may take depositions and compel .he production
of documents. Refusal to answer questions on Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination grounds may lead to "adverse factual dete:rminations. '"
Answering questions posed in the civil proceeding may provide grist for
the criminal trial. 6 1 In short, the Torres court's approach requires
defendant to either forfeit his property without the government having to
make any showing of illegality or run a much greater risk of self-
incrimination than he would in a criminal trial alone.
66
Further, the holding in Torres undermines the Supreme Court's
"successive punishments" prohibition. If jeopardy can only attach to a
criminal defendant in proceeding, it makes no difference whether
multiple, successive punishments were imposed or not.'67 Under the
159. Id. at 1464.
160. id.
161. Id. at 1465 (citing Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391-92 (1975)).
162. Id. at 1465-66.
163. Kessler, supra note 7, § 2.03, at 2-6.
164. Id. at 2-7.
165. But see United States v. Cretacci, 62 F.3d 307, 311 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that defendant
does not incriminate himself by claiming that he owns property subject to forfeiture).
166. In addition to the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Fifth Amendment also provides that a person
shall not "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S Const. amend. V.
167. Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377 (1975), upon which Torres relies, was a "successive
prosecutions" case of the purest sort. In Serfass, the defendant/petitioner was irdicted to failing to
report for and submit to induction into the armed forces. The district court granted
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Torres court's reasoning, a defendant may be punished repeatedly, so
long as those punishments are not brought in a "proceeding," an outcome
which must certainly raise due process concerns. Alternatively the court
may be saying that unless a sanction is imposed after a judicial
proceeding, it is not punishment. Either interpretation creates a
distasteful result.
Instead, the focus should be on whether the $60,000 forfeiture was
intended to punish the defendant's behavior. If it was, it should not
matter whether the defendant was party to the proceeding or not.
(Arguably, if the defendant had submitted a claim, it would be
considered punishment.) The government's intent behind the forfeiture
does not change merely because a defendant fails to file a claim in a
forfeiture proceeding.
Again, the traditional reasoning in these situations states that the guilt
of the owner is not relevant-it is the guilt of the forfeited property that
is germane: "'[F]orfeiture is not tied to or dependent upon the
wrongdoing of the owner of the monetary instruments."",168
Consequently, the argument is that the first punishment is directed at the
property itself and the second punishment at the individual.
However, the Supreme Court has intimated that reliance on that
statutory in rem forfeitures and especially the "guilty property" fiction
would no longer suffice.'69 In reality, the guilty property fiction rests on
the premise "that the owner who allows his property to become involved
in an offense has been negligent."' 70 Explaining the technical distinctions
between in rem and in personam proceedings as primarily developed to
expand a court's jurisdiction over a property's absentee owner, the court
cautioned that reliance on such technicalities "would be misplaced. ' '7 1
defendant/petitioner's pre-trial motion to dismiss, but was reversed by the court of appeals and the
case remanded for trial. Defendant/petitioner then argued that the trial was barred under double
jeopardy principles. The Supreme Court held that jeopardy did not attach to the pre-trial dismissal of
an indictment, and affirmed the court of appeals' opinion. Note that defendantpetitioner had not yet
received a hearing on the merits, and had not yet been subjected to any punishment.
168. United States v. United States Currency in the Amount of $145,139.00, 18 F.3d 73, 74 (2d
Cir.) (quoting United States v. $6,700, 615 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 72
(1994).
169. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2808-09 (1993).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2809 n.9. This view has been undercut, somewhat, by the Supreme Court's recent
holding in Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (rejecting innocent owner defense by relying,
in large part, on historical pedigree of guilty property fiction).
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Though the Court may not be ready to abandon the guilty property
fiction entirely, 72 it must still be recognized that a forfeiture is ultimately
a determination of a defendant's culpability. Even though in Torres the
court could not prove, absent defendant's filing a claim, that the currency
belonged to the defendant, Torres has been repeatedly applied to cases
where the property being forfeited could easily be traced -o the claimant
via automobile titles, deeds of trust, bank accounts, or bills of sale.'73
Under such circumstances, it is difficult to envision how a forfeiture does
not act as a determination of a defendant's culpability or how the
defendant avoids a second "sting of punishment."' 74
Perhaps recognizing the problems inherent in Torres's approach, one
court has advanced a different rationale for denying double jeopardy
protection in this situation-namely, where a defendant fails to file a
claim in a civil forfeiture proceeding, he abandons his property,
relinquishing "all right, title, claim, and possession." 75  Still,
abandonment requires an element of intent-one must abandon one's
property with no intention of reclaiming it or resuming its ownership,
possession, or enjoyment in the future. 76 Where, as in the case discussed,
a jailed defendant is required to post a cost bond totaling thousands of
dollars together with a claim of owrership to contest the claim in court,
17
a failure to file a claim of ownership may not show so much an intent to
relinquish his property interest as an inability to pay the requisite bond.
But what is really going on in cases such as Torres and Cretacci is
that the circuits are scrambling to find ways to deny retroactivity to the
double jeopardy principles laid out in Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch.
By emphasizing the historical understanding of forfeiture as punishment
and the basis for the "successive punishments" doctrine in established
case law, the Supreme Court has made it possible to argue that hundreds
of civil forfeiture/criminal prosecution cases were unconstitutionally
172. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. 994.
173. See, e.g., United States v. Cretacci, 62 F.3d 307, 309 (9th Cir. 1995) (one Toyota MR-2);
United States v. Penny, 60 F.3d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1995) (10 buildings, automobiles, other assets),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 931 (1996).
174. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,447 n.7 (1989).
175. Cretacci, 62 F.3d at 310-11, (citing Black's Law Dictionary 2-3 (5th ed. !5,79)).
176. Black's Law Dictionary 2-3 (6th ed. 1990).
177. Cretacci, 62 F.3d at 309; 19 U.S.C. § 1608 (1994) (stating that many federal forfeiture statutes
obtain their procedures from United States custcms law or maritime law). See 18 U.S.C. § 981(d)
(1994) (applying "provisions of customs laws relating to the seizure, summary and judicial
forfeiture, condemnation of property for violation of the customs laws...."); 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)
(1994) (applying Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty Claims).
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decided. Where the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause may
result in a convicted criminal going free, the circuits seem extremely
reluctant to give it a liberal construction.
V. CONCLUSION
Over the past several years the punitive nature of "civil forfeiture" has
led to severe criticism of it in the press,'7 8 and has reminded the Supreme
Court of its early admonition: "Forfeitures are not favored; they should
be enforced only when within both letter and spirit of the law."' 79 Even
Congress has recognized its harsh, punitive effect. Since 1993, Congress
has been working on civil forfeiture reform legislation that would
remedy the most egregious aspects of the current law. 8'
In light of the emerging consensus against quasi-criminal sanctions,
and civil forfeitures in particular, the Supreme Court's rulings in Halper,
Austin, and Kurth Ranch, and their application in $405,089.23, should
not be viewed as terribly shocking. Instead, these rulings should be
understood as a common sense development in the law. By looking
behind the sanction to its actual intended effect, the Court may finally
bring some reason to double jeopardy interpretation, and insure that law
enforcement will no longer be able to deny a defendant's rights based on
historical fiction. Although the holdings in Halper, Austin, and Kurth
Ranch may produce "judgments of the most problematic sort," ' the
solution is not to deny a defendant basic constitutional protections
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. As the Supreme Court has previously
stated, "[t]he efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice
of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering
which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
land." 18
2
178. See, e.g., Schneider & Flaherty, supra note 6.
179. United States v. One 1936 Model Ford V-8 DeLuxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219,226 (1939).
180. Among other things, proposed legislation would shift the burden of proof to the government to
show by "clear and convincing evidence" that the unlawful act on which the forfeiture was based
actually occurred; appoint legal counsel for indigent defendants in civil forfeiture proceedings;
clarify innocent owner defenses; extend the time period for contesting forfeiture; and allow recovery
for damages caused by negligent handling or storage of property detained by law enforcement
officers. See Hyde, supra note 5, at 80-84.
181. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1958 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).

